There has been a progressive development in the synthesis of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) in power networks recently. ICT systems have become a vital part of every aspect of our daily lives and its integration into the electric power system has become paramount. ICTs support efficient incorporation of activities of all stakeholders of the power system to certify a more cost-effective and sustainable power system. The power system will exhibit intelligent monitoring and control, bidirectional communication between stakeholders and power system elements, security and safety of supply and self-healing qualities. However, asides from the vast benefits ICTs, their implementation within the power network come with some drawbacks which include element failures, failures due to interdependencies as well as vulnerabilities to cyber-attacks. These drawbacks can impact the reliability of the power network negatively. The objective of this paper is to investigate the impact of ICTs integration on the reliability of power networks in terms of empirical validation of standard reliability indices. This study groups the findings into four perspectives, including the effects of cyber power interdependencies, ICT infrastructure failures, cyber-attacks and environmental conditions. As expected, results show that failures and maloperations in the ICT network have adverse effects on system reliability and careful considerations need to be made to dampen these shortcomings.
There is currently an upward incline in interests on the deployment of Smart Grid. Even more, so is the rapid development of the integration of ICT systems in power networks. ICT systems have become a vital part of every aspect of our daily lives and its integration into the electric power system has grown paramount to match the increasing demand on the power system. The electric grid is a centralized internetwork of all parts including but not limited to generators, transformers, substations and transmission lines that deal with the generation of electrical energy, the transmission of power over very long distances and distribution of electrical power from various load hubs [1] . The current grid structure, which is lacking in reforms for as many as 100 years, is very complex and delivers energy with one-way power flow [2] . The grid is gradually getting to its limits in meeting up with the steadily increasing demand for electricity. Hence, it has become essential to boost reliability. This situation has called for a paradigm shift from the conventional grid to a more reliable Smart Grid (SG) or a modern cyber power internetwork that will utilize the application of digital processing and ICTs to efficiently incorporate the activities of all stakeholders of the power system. Shifting towards a smarter grid ultimately certifies a more cost-effective and sustainable power system that will exhibit intelligent applications like intelligent monitoring and control, bidirectional communication between stakeholders and power system elements, security and safety of supply and self-healing qualities [1] [2] [3] [4] . Implementation of ICTs enable power system operators to be better efficient. Some of the direction for ICT implementation include Interoperability of bidirectional communication technologies between different infrastructure devices within the power system Demand-side management programs, Open Architectures for EVs, MGs and other DERs, Standards and protocols are guiding the interoperability of ICT in power systems and Cybersecurity measures [4] . All these ICT perspectives can be deployed to cater to such system requirements as situational awareness, planning and operations and flexibility to accommodate increased numbers of DERs on the distribution system as well as to improve processes and self-healing during downtimes [4] .
Reliability in power systems is an important characteristic which accurately measures the probability of a system to adequately function for a required period and under specific or variable operating conditions [5] . The primary function of a power system is to supply electricity to connected consumers, and significant stakeholders in the power sector all strive to achieve this primary purpose.
In modern power systems, there is a fundamental need for all stakeholders including energy generators, transmission network owners and operators, energy distributors to be aware of the required standard to which they must operate to attain optimum reliability of the overall power system. So, there are different requirements in the form of reliability measures which are unique to each stakeholder of the power system [6] . Reliability studies generally discuss two basic functional system states. The first state, termed adequacy, is the presence of required facilities to supply the energy that the customers expect and have demanded without the consideration of system disturbances. The second system state also is known as security refers to the capability of the power system to deal with sudden disturbances like loss of system components, line faults or whatever form of abnormality that may exist within the system [7] . Implementation of ICTs in the power network significantly boosts power system reliability. Chances are that situational awareness will be more accurate when the network presents intelligent applications like intelligent monitoring, protection and control, two-way real-time communication, which brings the prospect of making adequate decisions to operate the power system efficiently. Adequate awareness ultimately improves the reliability of the power system to a significant extent. However, ICT implementation involves integrating the power network with new elements and features which are also prone to failure at some point. So, reliability studies need to consider the individual reliability of these ICT elements in order not to jeopardize the overall power system reliability. Moreover, ICT implementation involves the network to be in active connection to the internet, which also poses other threats like cyber-attacks. This paper reviews studies which address the impact of ICT on the reliability of power systems.
This paper aims to present findings from current literature about the impact of ICT implementation on the power system reliability. In the remainder of the article, section II briefly describes ICT in power systems, section III presents the findings of the literature review, section IV itemizes some current issues, and the paper concludes in section V.
II. ICT IN POWER SYSTEMS
The current electricity network structure is highly complex and has remained unchanged for decades and as such, become a hindrance to the advancement of the electricity supply chain. Currently, most of the grid's power flows are unidirectional sourced from a centralized pool of power generation facilities where the reliability is ensured by having a reserve capacity. This mainstream approach increases the generation capacity to meet the increasing electricity demand. The lack of infrastructural change, growing population, climate change, poor visibility, slow response times, lack of situational awareness has made the grid inefficient and less reliable and as such deterred the evolution of the power sector [3] . China alone consumed about 1138TWh of electricity in 2000, and this figure rose to 4921TWh in 2015 [8] . Forecasts show an increase in electricity consumption by 4.2% annually until 2022 [1] . The grid thus needs to be transformed into a more intelligent internetwork to accommodate the ever-growing demand.
Smart Grid is an internetwork of electrical power components that can efficiently incorporate the activities of all its stakeholders including but not limited to generators, transmission lines and the electricity consumers to certify a more cost-effective, flexible, reliable and sustainable power system. A requirement to transform the current grid to a smart state is the implementation of ICT to ensure a bidirectional cyber-physical system where all stakeholders of the network are in active communication thereby promoting intelligent monitoring and control and self-healing qualities by the grid [4] , [9] . The smart grid aims to decrease the pressure on the current power grid by decentralizing the generation sources and influencing usage patterns of electricity consumers to make them more conscious in energy conservation by launching programs such as Demand Side Management (DSM). It improves the reliability of the power network by improving fault detection and self-healing without the involvement of any personnel. It also improves the flexibility of the system to be able to incorporate distributed energy resources (DERs) such as renewable energy sources like wind, hydro and solar generation, as well as controllable loads. It also aims to electrify the transport sector, for example, electric vehicles, incorporate energy storage systems onto the grid to compensate during peak demand periods, encourage the development of smart cities, as well as boost the general efficiency and sustainability of the power grid [1] , [3] , [10] .
The presence of ICT infrastructure within the power system provides an avenue by which the power systems can more efficiently manage its overall increased complexity and size. Due to the accessibility to reliable bidirectional real-time data on the state of the power system, the possibility to operate within narrower limits of security has become possible. ICT presence decreases the frequency and duration of supply interruptions and has contributed to a reduction of total operation costs [11] .
Failures can occur in the ICT system within the power network at any point. These malfunctions of the ICT components can lead to the determent of the adequacy functionality of the power grid. Possibly due to a subsystem getting an incorrect or inadequate data needed for performing the normal operation or a delay/failure in sending a load or dispatch control signal. A dependence on ICT systems can significantly increase the weakness and exposure of the power network to threats and malicious attacks. So, the ability of the power network to maintain confidentiality, availability and integrity despite the prevailing disturbances is a crucial focus for modern power systems [12] . The reliability indices are quantified to assess the situation while considering both the combined ICT and power system infrastructure holistically [13] . There are four major categories of ICT within the power system, namely; Acquisition, communication, processing and Implementation subsystems [11] , [14] , [15] . Fig. 2 shows the categories and their relationship. a. Acquisition: collects instantaneous system status data like power flow measurements, CB status, bus voltage and frequency measurements, the status of switching devices and delivers these data to the processing subsystem via the communication subsystem. b. Processing: assesses the data received from the acquisition subsystem to determine the state of the power network and informs the operator of the real-time system state. A state estimator is an essential tool in the processing subsystem that gives reliable representations of the power network based on the input from the acquisition subsystem. The results from the state estimator are used to make adequate decisions for implementation. c. Implementation: uses the results from the system processing to carry out necessary actions like triggering protective relays and circuit breakers after detection of a fault on the power network. d. Communication: this is the medium through which all other subsystems coordinate within the power network either via wired or wireless channels.
A. CYBER-POWER INTERDEPENDENCIES
The modern power systems which consist of a hybrid cyber network and physical power network are typically called cyber-power networks. As such, interdependencies exist between elements and networks within the hybrid system implying that the functionality of a component or a network impacts the functionality of components in/or the other network in the larger hybrid system [16] . Four types of interdependencies generally classified into two subgroups, namely; direct interdependency and indirect interdependency. The classification of the interdependencies depends on the location of failures within the cyber network. b. Direct Network-Element Interdependency (DNEI): the performance of one network impacts an element in the other system [17] . As shown in fig 3, a failure in a communication link in the cyber network can cause a mis operation of a generator in the power network. Applications of direct interdependencies include loss of stability and control as well as the loss of operation within the hybrid network. Article [18] describes these applications in detail.
2) INDIRECT INTERDEPENDENCY
These are more complex relationships than direct interdependencies. Maloperations of a cyber network or its element indirectly impact the functionality of a power network or its element [16] . When a failure occurs in the cyber system or its element, the power network still functions, but the impact of the failure presents potential future failures in the power network or the loss of certain functionalities/capacities.
a. Indirect Element-Element Interdependency (IEEI):
Failures occur in cyber elements that are in physical connection with a power element. However, this does not deter the power element from functioning optimally at the instant of failure; rather, the power element is at risk of possible future failure [19] . In fig 3, if an RTU malfunctions, this could mean that a particular monitoring function has failed. The failure could result in an impaired situational awareness which does not affect the functionality of the power element at the instant but can present an increased likelihood of maloperation in the power element subsequently. b. Indirect Network-Element Interdependency: Failures occur within the cyber network but does not directly and immediately affect a power element. It rather makes the power element prone to subsequent failures [19] . For instance, if there is a failure in the communication link that gives information to the protection system, it means a protective device will lack information at the instant of a subsequent fault which could damage the element in the power system. This paper reviews various articles which have studied the impacts of various interdependencies mentioned above on power system reliability and synthesizes the results in section III.
III. LITERATURE REVIEW
The literature review is conducted to answer the following questions to achieve the aim of checking the impacts of ICTs on power system reliability;
a. What is the actual numerical measure of the effect that penetration of ICTs has on standard reliability indices to determine the overall impact on system reliability? b. What case studies and probabilistic modelling techniques are in current usage for assessment of the relationship between ICT and power systems?
In the review process, three databases IEEE, Science Direct and Scopus, were examined from the year 2000 till date. The search yielded a significant number of full-length journal and conference proceeding articles. The study considers the following inclusion criteria while selecting the papers for final review;
a. The study addresses relationships between ICTs and power systems. b. The study demonstrates probabilistic modelling techniques in analysis. c. The article evaluates the reliability of the power system by giving actual measures of standard reliability indices.
A. SYNTHESIS OF FINDINGS
This subsection presents findings on the impact of ICT on reliability from existing literature. The reviewed studies classify into four perspectives based on individual themes. These groups are; cyber power interdependencies, cyberattacks, infrastructure failures and weather and environmental conditions. This paper also examines the case studies/cyber network components, reliability evaluation methods for the ICT subsystem as well as the overall impact of ICT on the power network in each article.
B. IMPACT OF CYBER POWER INTERDEPENDENCIES
As previously explained in section II, two primary groups of interdependencies exist in cyber power networks. These interdependencies whether direct or indirect has an impact on the overall reliability of the larger network. Article [17] demonstrates failures from direct interdependencies, and it determines that reliability dwindles more from faults in the ICT network than in the power network. It also shows that ring topologies with redundant features could increase reliability indices compared to other structural arrangements of cyber network components. In [20] three topologies bus, ring and star were also tested in a system with DG of wind and diesel to improve the overall reliability. It concludes that communication devices, such as switches could effectively influence system adequacy.
Monitoring and protection systems are applications of indirect CPIs. Article [19] demonstrates the effect of indirect CPI and results show that not taking the monitoring and protection system into account during reliability studies poses a threat to the overall reliability of the power system. Failures in both subsystems could also potentially decrease overall system reliability. [18] compare the impact of direct and indirect CPIs and found that information exchange between both CPIs makes them interconnected which shows the importance of studying both types of CPIs simultaneously.
C. IMPACT OF CYBER ATTACKS
The inclusion of ICTs in power networks comes with certain drawbacks, one of which is the vulnerability to cyber-attacks such as the violation of communication protocols to tamper with information availability. Such attacks are called Denial of Service attacks (DoS) and they can be deployed at various levels of the communication within the power network. False data injection, intrusion, phishing, sabotage and terrorism are also common types of attacks against the power system. The recent false data injection cyber-attack on Ukrainian distribution grids in 2015, motivated the governments to perceive cyber-attacks as a national security issue and moved to make power networks stealthier [25] . Attacks capitalize on the vulnerability of the security system of the networks and are mostly caused by injecting false data to tarnish the system integrity.
Cyber-attacks can impact the power network either directly or indirectly. For direct impact, an incorrect command is sent to a cyber element to cause the primary infrastructure to function incorrectly thereby resulting in a system blackout while in indirect effect, wrong measurement information is sent to the cyber component to tamper with the decision making of the system [26] . SCADA/EMS and CBs are typical targets of cyber-attacks because the SCADA is responsible for monitoring the situational awareness of the system, and the CB directly controls the operations of essential network elements. Cyber-attacks negatively impact the cost, efficiency and overall reliability of power networks. In article [27] , the impact of various types of cyber-attack on power system operations such as state estimation voltage control and automatic generation control are reviewed.
Articles [28] , [29] study the impact of load redistribution attacks. LR attack is when an attacker injects wrong data to a localized part of the system to tamper with the state estimation of the network to avoid detection and to cause chaos. Once there is misinformation about the real-time state of the network, operators make wrong decisions based on incorrect state estimation results which may be detrimental to the operations of the power network. Article [30] addresses malicious tripping of wind turbines in wind farms in which attackers intrude on the system by sending spurious commands to the SCADA/EMS to cause widespread disruption in electricity supply. Tables 2(A) and(B) specify the results of these and other notable studies considering cyber-attacks.
D. IMPACT OF ICT INFRASTRUCTURE FAILURES
Where ICT elements are increasingly becoming a great part of the modern power system, possibilities of their failures must be put into consideration so appropriate planning can be done to avoid adverse effects on power system reliability. Author [37] classifies the reliability of ICT equipment into functional and network failures because the two states have varying results when considering intelligent applications. Functional failures cause the ICT element to be unable to execute a command which can further lead to loss of situational TABLE 1. (a) Impact of direct cyber power interdependency on power system reliability. (b) Impact of indirect cyber power interdependency on power system reliability. awareness capability for monitoring and control by the EMS. While in network failures, the ICT element remains functional but fails at processing external commands. ICT elements can fail to send correct control, demand response, load shed, open/close command, measurement, and status data signals to their respective terminals [38] . Failures could also occur while processing a fault as well as Cyber-induced dependent failures (CDFs). Tables 3(a)-(c) show the results of studies that assess the effect of failures in the cyber network infrastructure on network reliability.
E. IMPACT OF WEATHER AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS ON ICTS
Rainstorms and other adverse weather conditions can impact the communication signal in a power system negatively. The movement of cloud patterns can also influence renewable energy generation significantly. Topographical and meteorological conditions can also increase the noise level in ICT transmission mediums. All these factors can impact the reliability of the power network severely.
Articles [53] and [54] employ a meteorological model to simulate local weather conditions that can attenuate the performance of ICT wireless Wi-Max networks to determine the reliability of ADNs. In article [12] , data from weather station monitoring systems in a UK based ADS trial project were sampled for 28 days to determine the reliability of the monitoring system by examining the effect of weather changes on real-time thermal rating. Table 4 shows the results of these studies.
F. CASE STUDIES
Several case studies have been used to demonstrate the process of reliability evaluation of power networks. In the reviewed studies, several standardized test networks are used in the evaluation process. The IEEE and RBTS test systems are very popular in the reviewed studies constituting over 60% of the examined papers. The standard test systems are developed for the purpose of research to aid the process of reliability evaluation in generation and composite systems and to be able to compare techniques used for reliability analysis. The basic system data required for reliability assessment are provided in these test networks [56] , [57] . Authors use these test networks by adding ICT extensions to the existing standardized system thereby allowing them to carry out reliability evaluation. Researchers also commonly use very simple developed networks for assessment such as in [11] , [17] and seven other studies. Another group of studies used real networks for the assessment of reliability. In [20] and [21] the 20kV distribution system of HREC of Iran was used as their case study while in [42] a real hydropower station in the UK was featured.
G. RELIABILITY EVALUATION METHODS IN CYBER-POWER NETWORKS
The reliability assessment of power systems can either be carried out using Analytical or simulation methods [5] , [7] . Reliability assessment is deployed to assess the economic effect of power system failures. Modelling techniques first used in practical applications were all deterministic. Analytical methods use mathematical models to determine the reliability metrics. These methods can be bulky and impractical when large scale networks with very complex schemes are involved [58] . Simulation techniques on the other hand, usually based on Monte Carlo methods, consider the actual process and random behavior of system components included and have been used in many studies to TABLE 2. (a) Impact of cyber-attacks on power system reliability. (b) Impact of cyber-attacks on power system reliability. VOLUME 8, 2020 analyze large amounts of system states for large iterations of simulations [59] , [60] . Although computational times are significantly longer in simulation methods, these techniques permit a high degree of complexity in system modelling while considering the practical essence of the derived reliability indices [7] . Fig 4 depicts a high-level process in the simulation method for reliability assessment. The process begins by inputting data samples in form of failure rates, repair rates and other network data. Next the process checks for failures by sampling and then uses probabilistic techniques to carry out analyses. Finally, after convergence reliability indices which represent the output of the process are computed. These indices represent the empirical value of economic impact of network reliability and importantly, presents adequate information for system planning.
The conventional reliability assessment techniques, which primarily focus on the power network separately from the ICT infrastructure are well researched into and quite mature. However, reliability assessment of the cyber part of the system in conjunction with the power network is still in its early stages with much work yet undone. The setback is that these methods primarily focus on the power network while assuming that the ICT network is 100% reliable. Because of the rise in the level of ICT integration, it is proving to be impractical and counterproductive to make such assumptions [12] .
Different researchers have proposed diverse methods to model the ICT network, such as state mapping and updating, modified Markov chains. However, these methods do not adequately quantify the actual state of all ICT parts of the CPS. Other studies have developed more comprehensive methods with the researchers saddled with the extra task of modifying test networks with ICT extensions for specific single use. Moreover, these test networks only account for small localized networks which lack the generality and applicability to depict the actual reliability of the broader composite system. The literature review shows that 58% of the studies examined favored the conventional sequential Monte Carlo simulation methods while incorporating some analytical methods like the event tree, fault tree, CPIM and CEM to name a few. Five articles used the non SMCS method while two articles [53] , [54] used the PSMCS method. Articles [12] , [48] present a co-simulation tool which refers to the simulation of both cyber and power network concurrently to assess reliability. This permits detailed ICT modelling with power networks in a holistic assessment. Furthermore, seven studies present purely analytical methods such as state mapping and updating, and complex network theory mainly to assess relatively small power networks. Table 5 lists some notable techniques used in the examined studies for cyber system reliability assessment.
H. POWER SYSTEM RELIABILITY INDICES
In reliability studies, probability of a system to function adequately under specified conditions are measured.
As explained in section I, all stakeholders within the three hierarchies of the electric power system have a required standard to which they must operate to attain optimum overall reliability. This is in the form of reliability measures which are unique to each stakeholder of the power system. Reliability analysis typically consist of three broad stages: state selection, state evaluation and finally index calculation [61] . These measures are generally called reliability or adequacy indices. Reliability evaluation is carried out by using a wide range of methods such as those mentioned in subsection G above, after which reliability indices are calculated. These indices represent the measure of reliability of power systems. VOLUME 8, 2020 Majority of these indices represent expected values of a random variable which is not actually a deterministic measure. They are average values of the examined occurrence over a long period of time [62] . These expected values are considered sufficient in indicating adequacy status of a system because they show factors such as system component availability and capacity, load characteristics and uncertainty, system configurations and operational conditions [62] . The deduced indices assist utilities and system operators to plan adequately and make the right decisions to enhance the operations of power systems [63] .
In generating system reliability assessment, some of the commonly used indices are Loss of Load Probability (LOLP), Loss of Load Expectation (LOLE), Loss of Energy Probability (LOEP), Loss of Energy Expectation (LOEE), and Loss of Load Frequency (LOLF) and Loss of Load Duration (LOLD).
In composite reliability assessment, some indices such as Expected Energy Not Served (EENS), Expected Frequency of Load Curtailment (EFLC), Expected Demand not Supplied (EDNS), Expected Energy not Produced (EENP) and Probability Load Curtailment (PLC).
In distribution system evaluation, indices such as SAIFI, SAIDI, CAIFI, ASAI as well as ENS are commonly used as measures of reliability [7] , [62] .
Generally, the most commonly used indices are the LOLE, LOLP, EENS, SAIFI and SAIDI as evidenced in this paper from the reviewed studies. These indices [7] , [62] are explained below. a. LOLE is the average number of days or hours in given period of usually a year in which the available generating capacity becomes less than the daily peak or hourly load. b. LOLP is the probability that the available generation will be insufficient to meet the load demand. LOLP just defines the likelihood of days of trouble but does not give the measure of severity. c. EENS represents the ratio of the unserved expected energy in the duration of a long period of examination to the total energy demand during that same period.
EENS has the longest convergence time compared to other indices ensuring that the right number of samplings have been carried out [64] , [65] . d. SAIFI is a customer-based index that gives information about the average frequency of interruptions that a customer would experience. e. SAIDI is also a customer based index which is the average outage time that a customer experiences.
IV. CURRENT ISSUES
This section presents some current issues in the study of ICT impact on power system reliability. a. Impact of different adverse weather conditions on ICT infrastructure in the generation and composite power systems to determine its effects on overall power system reliability still needs further research. Although some studies are available in this area, it still requires more attention from researchers. b. New research needs to consider additional factors in evaluating the impact of local LR attacks on system adequacy. More investigation should also be done on methods to defend the power system against LR attacks. c. Standard test systems that include ICT infrastructure are currently unavailable. This makes the comparison of methods to assess their efficiency challenging. Generic testbeds need to be developed to encourage a more unified and standard performance evaluation of CPS. Studies [66] and [67] made efforts of developing a benchmark test system for CPS. d. Studies assessing the impact of System Integrity Protection Scheme on power system reliability is yet to be fully mature. Research [68] proposes a risk assessment method to check the effect of undesirable interactions between SIPS and the results show that malfunctions in SIPS pose an increased risk to system integrity. Article [69] presents a technique based on Markov modelling for risk assessment of SIPS maloperations in power system. In studies [15] , [70] , [71] , Markov modelling and Fault Tree Analysis were used for component-level reliability analysis of generic SIPS. The studies cited above don't mainly evaluate the effect of implementing SIPS on the reliability of the broader composite network.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The tight coupling of the ICT and power network in the cyber power network will significantly increase the efficiency and overall reliability of the system while also presenting potential risks of failures at some point which has adverse negative impacts on the overall reliability of the power network. Implementation of ICT allows effective management of the increased complexity of modern power systems with enhanced capabilities of operating within narrower limits due to the improvement of situational awareness capabilities. Operators can make better and quicker decisions regarding network functions which ultimately saves costs and decreases frequency and duration at which supply interruptions occur. System planners must give adequate attention to these ICT factors in the planning stages of the power network. ICT could be a potential disadvantage to the power network. However, if it is considered adequately in the planning stages with the infusion of necessary redundancies, its benefits to the broader network reliability far outweigh its shortcomings. The presence of ICT reduces the levels of standard reliability metrics such as EENS as evidenced in the examined studies.
